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Understanding the Price Puzzle
ew economists expected the bond market’s
negative reaction to the Federal Reserve’s
initial move to raise the federal funds rate during
early 1994. To alleviate potential inflationary
pressures, on February 4, 1994, the Federal Reserve
increased the federal funds rate by 25 basis points
to 3.25 percent. In response, long-term bond
yields promptly increased 50 basis points over the
following four weeks. At the time, bond market
participants attributed much of the run-up in
yields to worries that inflation would increase
during the next year, thus eroding the value of
fixed-income securities.
While many economists were caught off
guard by the bond market’s reaction, historical data
on the federal funds rate and subsequent inflation
behavior perhaps explain the reaction. Historical
data show a positive relationship between infla-
tion and the federal funds rate, the rate over which
the Federal Reserve has the most control.1 Thus,
one explanation for the bond market’s behavior is
that increases in the federal funds rate have his-
torically been associated with subsequent increases
in inflation. If history is any guide, bond market
participants were right to be worried.
The positive relationship between the federal
funds rate and inflation has become known as the
“price puzzle” (Bernanke and Blinder 1992; Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1994, forthcoming;
and Sims 1992). It is a puzzle because an unex-
pected tightening of monetary policy (that is, an
unexpected increase in the federal funds rate) is
expected to be followed by a decrease in the price
level, rather than an increase.
In this article, we document the positive
correlation between federal funds rate increases
and subsequent increases in prices. The strength
of this correlation does not appear to be uniform
over the postwar period. In previous work (Balke
and Emery 1994), we found that relationships that
had held in the 1960s and 1970s broke down in
the 1980s. As a result, we also evaluate whether
the price puzzle is present to the same degree in
all periods. We find that evidence of the price
puzzle is substantially stronger during the 1960s
and 1970s than during the 1980s. In the 1980s,
the correlation between the federal funds rate
and future inflation is close to zero but is still not
negative, as traditional theory would predict.
We also evaluate possible explanations for
the price puzzle. These involve the Federal Re-
serve systematically responding to signals of
higher future inflation by raising the federal funds
rate, but not by enough to fully offset the subse-
quent inflation. Indeed, a plausible explanation
appears to be that, during the 1960s and 1970s, the
Federal Reserve responded to supply shocks by
raising the federal funds rate but not by enough to
prevent the aggregate price level from changing.
Thus, a positive correlation between the federal
funds rate and inflation arises. Since the early
1980s, however, the price puzzle has moderated.
We suggest two possible reasons: the Federal
Reserve has put more emphasis on achieving
price stability and, hence, has responded more
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1 The Federal Reserve influences this rate by buying or
selling U.S. Treasury securities to the private sector, thus
controlling the amount of reserves in the banking system.
The federal funds rate is simply the market interest rate
that banks must pay to borrow reserves overnight.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 16
vigorously to inflationary shocks, or there simply
have been fewer large inflationary shocks to the
economy.
This article is organized as follows. In the
first section, we document the positive correlation
between federal funds rate changes and subse-
quent inflation. In the second section, we present
possible explanations for the price puzzle. Both
explanations involve the Federal Reserve’s system-
atic response to inflationary shocks. The third
section examines whether these explanations are
capable of explaining the price puzzle. Finally, in
the fourth section, we conclude by interpreting
the empirical results.
Documenting the price puzzle
The price puzzle arises because increases in
the federal funds rate tend to be followed by in-
creases in inflation. In this section, we document
the existence of this positive correlation.
Figure 1
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SOURCE: Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System.
As shown in Figure 1, the federal funds rate
and year-over-year inflation, as measured by the
gross domestic product deflator, appear to be posi-
tively related: periods of high inflation coincide
with relatively high federal funds rates. Note that
during the 1960s and 1970s, both inflation and the
federal funds rate have trended upward, whereas
since 1982, the trend in inflation has been flat,
while the federal funds rate has trended downward.
More formal evidence of the price puzzle is
given in Table 1. Table 1 presents results from
simple regressions of the federal funds rate against
the average annualized rate of inflation over two
subsequent years for the sample 1960:1 through
1993:4. Whether or not a time trend is included in
the regressions, the results confirm a positive rela-
tionship between the federal funds rate and future
inflation. For the full sample and the 1960–79
subsample, the federal funds rate is highly signifi-
cant. Interestingly, for the 1982:4–93:4 sample, the
federal funds rate does not contain statistically sig-
nificant explanatory power for subsequent infla-
tion as reflected in an insignificant t-statistic on the
federal funds rate and a negative adjusted-R 2 for
the regression.2 This suggests that the price puzzle
may not be as evident in the post-1982 period.
The federal funds rate, monetary policy,
and the price puzzle
Historically, changes in the quantity of money
have often served as a measure of monetary
policy. The main problem with money, however,
is that it often changes for reasons that have
nothing to do with monetary policy. For example,
most measures of money are influenced by the
behavior of both banks and individuals, which, in
turn, are influenced by economic conditions. In
other words, the observed data on money repre-
sent a confluence of both supply factors (mone-
tary policy actions) and demand factors (such as
private-sector portfolio shifts). The problem with
using money as a measure for the stance of mone-
tary policy is that it does not reflect mainly Fed-
eral Reserve actions.
Recently, several economists have argued
that movements in the federal funds rate may be a
better indicator of changes in monetary policy than
are changes in the quantity of money (McCallum
1983, Laurent 1988, Bernanke and Blinder 1992,
2 Throughout the paper, we do not separately examine the
1979:4 through 1982:3 sample because during this period,
in contrast to the rest of the sample, the Federal Reserve
did not target the federal funds rate in its implementation
of monetary policy.Economic Review — Fourth Quarter 1994 17
and Goodfriend 1992). This view is based on the
observation that, with the exception of the 1979–82
period, the Federal Reserve has implemented
monetary policy by targeting the federal funds
rate over short periods of time.
There is a potential shortcoming in directly
using the federal funds rate as a measure of the
stance of monetary policy. Movements in the rate
reflect both the Federal Reserve’s response to
economic developments, as well as Federal Reserve
actions that are independent, or exogenous, of
these developments.3 To assess the impact of ex-
ogenous monetary policy actions on the economy,
several studies have used empirical models called
vector autoregressions (VARs). (See the box en-
titled “Vector Autoregressions.”) Basically, these
models attempt to isolate the movements in the
federal funds rate that are uncorrelated with
changes in the other variables in the model and,
thereby, represent purely exogenous movements
in the federal funds rate, or exogenous monetary
policy actions.
Using the VAR methodology, Bernanke and
Blinder (1992), Sims (1992), and Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994, forthcoming) have
found that movements in the federal funds rate
are largely consistent with the view that the funds
rate is a good proxy for the stance of monetary
policy. In this work, the Federal Reserve tightens
policy in response to unexpected increases in
both inflation and output. Additionally, unex-
pected, or exogenous, monetary policy actions
are shown to have modest effects on real output.
However, even in these VARs the price puzzle
remains: exogenous monetary policy tightenings
are followed by increases in the price level.
Consider a five-variable VAR similar to that
examined by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1994). This VAR includes real GDP (Y ), the GDP
deflator (P), the federal funds rate, nonborrowed
reserves, and total reserves.4 Figure 2 displays the
response of output and prices to a so-called ex-
Table 1
Federal Funds Rate Regressed on Subsequent Inflation1
Trend not included Trend included
Coefficient on Coefficient on
Sample federal funds rate adj. R 2 federal funds rate adj. R 2
1960:1–93:4 .26 .15 .30 .15
(2.11)* (2.38)*
1960:1–79:3 .75 .56 .17 .92
(4.91)* (2.72)*
1982:4–93:4 .09 .01 .05 0
(.59) (.43)
1 Subsequent inflation equals the average annualized rate of inflation over the subsequent eight quarters as measured by the gross
domestic product deflator.
T-statistics are in parentheses. To correct for possible heteroscedasticity as well as  serial correlation, the White consistent
covariance matrix with a Newey–West serial correlation correction and with a window width of twelve lags was estimated.
* Significant at the 5-percent level.
Quarterly data.
SOURCE: Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System.
3 The rule that relates policy actions to developments in the
economy is often referred to as the feedback rule.
4 With the exception of the federal funds rate, all variables
are in logarithms.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 18
ogenous increase in the federal funds based on
the entire 1960–93 sample.5 While output falls in
response to a monetary contraction, prices rise.
Thus, the price puzzle is present.
When the full sample is broken into sub-
samples, the VAR evidence of a price puzzle
becomes mixed.6 Figure 3 plots the response of
prices to a federal funds shock in the 1960–79
period and the post-1982 period. As shown in the
figure, the price puzzle is present in the 1960–79
period; an exogenous increase in the federal funds
rate results in a substantial increase in the price
level. By contrast, the price puzzle is not as evi-
dent in the post-1982 period. During this period,
a federal funds rate innovation does not cause
prices to systematically rise; the effect on prices,
though negative, is small and not statistically
different from zero.
An alternative to the VAR approach
Rather than using the federal funds rates as
an indicator of monetary policy or trying to iden-
tify monetary interventions econometrically, Romer
and Romer (1989) examine the historical record to
determine dates when a contractionary monetary
policy action was taken.7 To evaluate whether the
price puzzle still exists using the Romer–Romer
dates as proxies for monetary contractions, we run
a regression of inflation (or prices) against four
lags of inflation and the current value and eight
Figure 2
Impulse Response of Y and P
To Federal Funds Rate Innovation, 1960–93
Log level
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Figure 3
Impulse Response of P
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5 The federal funds rate comes third, after output and prices,
in the causal ordering implied by the Choleski decomposi-
tion. The dotted lines in Figures 3 through 12 are one-
standard error confidence bands.
6 We tested whether a VAR estimated over 1960:1–79:3 was
the same as a VAR estimated over 1982:4–93:4 (see Doan
1992) and could reject the null hypothesis of equality. This
result was robust to whether the VAR was estimated in levels
or first differences.
7 The Romer–Romer dates are: 1968:4, 1974:2, 1978:3,
1979:4. The date 1988:3 is also included as a monetary
contraction, based on work by Oliner and Rudebusch
(1992).Economic Review — Fourth Quarter 1994 19
lags of a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
during a Romer–Romer monetary contraction date
and zero otherwise. Figure 4 plots the dynamic
response of the price level in response to the
Romer–Romer dummy. For the full sample and the
post-1982 sample, we see evidence of the price
puzzle; prices tend to rise following a Romer–
Romer monetary contraction. For the 1960–79
sample, the response of prices is initially flat and
then falls six quarters after a Romer–Romer con-
traction. This suggests that the Romer dates may
be a better proxy for monetary contractions in the
early part of the sample than in the later part.
Overall, there appears to be a positive corre-
lation between federal funds rate increases and
future inflation. However, the extent of this corre-
lation is sensitive to sample periods examined.
With the exception of the Romer–Romer dates, the
price puzzle is much more evident in the pre-1980
sample than in the post-1982 sample. This result
holds for sophisticated VAR or intervention analysis
as well as for simple regressions. In the next
section, we explore some explanations for the
positive correlation.
Explanations of the price puzzle
One explanation of the price puzzle sug-
gested by Sims (1992) is that the Federal Reserve
systematically responds to expectations of higher
future inflation by raising the federal funds rate
but by not enough to prevent inflation from actu-
ally rising. The result is that increases in the federal
funds rate are followed by increases in inflation.
The Sims explanation thus involves a forward-
looking Federal Reserve that, nonetheless, fails to
effectively prevent the anticipated future inflation.
It also implies that the positive correlation between
an apparently contractionary monetary policy in-
tervention and future prices stems, in part, from
failing to properly identify exogenous changes in
the federal funds rates. Sims suggests that the
Federal Reserve has information about future
inflation that is not present in the simple VARs
Vector autoregressions (VARs) are time series mod-
els that use only past values of the variables of interest to
make forecasts. For instance, a three-variable VAR sys-
tem of output, prices, and the federal funds rate can be
expressed as
Yt = β1 + β2Σ Yt–i + β3Σ Pt–i + β4Σ ft–i + βt
Pt = γ1 + γ2Σ Y t–i + γ3Σ Pt–i + γ4Σ ft–i + γ t
ft = δ1 + δ2Σ Yt–i + δ3Σ Pt–i + δ4Σ ft–i + δt ,
where Y, P, and f are output, the price level, and the
federal funds rate, respectively. β is an intercept term,
t is a time subscript, Σ is the summation sign, and  is
an error term. Thus, each of the three variables is ex-
pressed as a linear function of past values of itself and
past values of other variables in the system.
In practice, the estimated error terms from each
equation are correlated so that it is incorrect to assume
that, for instance, ft represents an independent surprise
movement in the federal funds rate. To better interpret the
dynamic relationships present in the data, the residuals
from the VAR are broken up into linear combinations of
independent (orthogonal) shocks. A common orthogo-
nalization is to assume that the VAR system is recursive
Vector Autoregressions
so that there is a chain of causality among surprises in the
variables during any given period. For example, a pos-
sible recursive system of the VAR above is one in which
output responds to an exogenous shock, the price level
responds to the contemporaneous output shock and an
exogenous price shock, while the federal funds rate
responds to output and price level shocks contempora-
neously as well as to an exogenous federal funds rate
shock. In effect, a new set of surprises, or shock terms for
each variable, are created that are now uncorrelated with
each other. The transformation of the original shocks into
recursive, orthogonal shocks is called the Choleski de-
composition.
The Choleski decomposition is controversial because
if the VAR is used to draw economic inferences, then the
recursive restriction imposed on the system should be
supported by economic theory. If the identifying assump-
tion of recursivity is not justified, then the estimated
parameters will be a mixture of both structural and
reduced-form parameters.
For more on VARs, see Todd (1990), Runkle (1987),
Sims (1986), Cooley and LeRoy (1985), and Hakkio and
Morris (1984).Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 20
described in the previous section, and as a result,
innovations in the federal funds rate from these
VARs partly reflect the systematic response to
inflationary shocks and are not truly exogenous.
An alternative, but similar, explanation is
that the Federal Reserve reacts to supply shocks
by raising the federal funds rate. A temporary,
negative supply shock, for example, would have
the effect of raising real interest rates, decreasing
output, and increasing prices (at least in the short
run). The Federal Reserve responds to the supply
shock by raising the federal funds rate but by not
enough to extinguish the inflationary consequences
of the supply shock. Note that the supply shock
explanation can explain both the price puzzle
and the negative response of output to a positive
federal funds rate innovation, even if monetary
policy has no effect on the real economy. Further-
more, the degree to which the monetary authority
is willing to “extinguish” the price increase might
depend on the weight it places on price stability
in its objective function relative to output stabili-
zation; the greater the weight on price stability, the
more aggressively the monetary authority reacts to
the supply shock and, hence, the smaller the price
puzzle.
Interestingly, for both explanations, the fact
that the price puzzle appears muted in the 1980s
suggests that the Federal Reserve’s reaction func-
tion may have changed. The Federal Reserve may
have become more forward looking in its inflation
fighting effort (trying to stay ahead of the curve)
and has more effectively preempted inflationary
pressures. Alternatively, it may have placed more
weight on price stability when reacting to supply
shocks.8
Is the price puzzle solved?
These explanations for the price puzzle
revolve around the Fed’s response to inflationary
pressures. Thus, to effectively evaluate these ex-
planations within a VAR framework, one must
introduce a variable into the system that contains
information about future inflation or supply shocks
that is not already contained in the existing VAR.
Furthermore, evaluating these explanations in-
volves examining the Fed’s reaction function;
namely, how does the federal funds rate respond
to possible inflationary shocks? Much of the pre-
vious literature has failed to note the Fed’s reac-
tion function.
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994,
forthcoming) have argued that the price puzzle is
8 Possibly, though, supply shocks may have been relatively
small or positive since 1982 so that the Fed could focus
more on its price stability objective. This explanation im-
plies an asymmetric objective function in which the Fed is
less willing to extinguish the inflationary consequences of
negative supply shocks (and suffer the negative output
consequences) than positive supply shocks.
Figure 4
Impulse Response Functions
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resolved when commodity prices are included in
the basic VAR examined earlier. Commodity prices
have been suggested to provide information about
future inflation and could also be correlated with
supply shocks. Thus, a priori, they are a good
candidate for inclusion in the VAR. We replicate
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans’ results when
we include commodity prices in the basic vector
autoregression.9 Figure 5 plots the response of
output and prices to a federal funds rate shock
once commodity prices have been included in the
VAR. As in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, a
positive federal funds rate shock causes prices
and output to fall. Furthermore, the reaction of
the federal funds rate to a commodity price shock
is consistent with the Sims and supply shock ex-
planations of the price puzzle: a positive com-
modity price shock causes the federal funds rate
to rise (not shown in figures). Indeed, the reaction
of the federal funds rate to positive output and
price shocks is consistent with a “lean against the
wind” policy on the part of the Fed.
While including commodity prices in the VAR
appears to solve the price puzzle for the full sample,
when we examine the subsamples the evidence
is less conclusive. Figure 6 presents the impulse
response function of prices to a federal funds rate
shock in the 1960–79 and 1982–93 subsamples.10
While commodity prices succeed in eliminating
the price puzzle in the latter period, they do not
solve the price puzzle in the pre-1980 period. For
the 1960–79 sample, prices are higher than their
original level for nearly three years after a positive
federal funds rate shock. Thus, even after includ-
Figure 5
Impulse Response of Y and P
To Federal Funds Rate Innovation, 1960–93
(Commodity Prices Included)
Log level
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9 In the vector autoregression, commodity prices come after
output and aggregate prices but before the federal funds
rate in the Choleski ordering.
10 We tested whether the VAR parameter estimates were the
same in the 1960–79 and post-1982 samples and could
reject equality.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 22
ing commodity prices in the VAR, the price puzzle
is still unresolved for the 1960–79 period.
We examine whether other variables might
be able to solve the price puzzle; these include
the spread between long- and short-term interest
rates, short- and long-term interest rates individu-
ally, oil prices, stock prices, unit labor costs, the
index of leading economic indicators, and indus-
trial capacity utilization.11 Of these, only the spread
between long- and short-term interest rates helps
solve the price puzzle, but it does so only if the
period 1979–82 is excluded.12 Figure 7 shows the
Figure 7
Impulse Response Functions of P


















































































11 These were done one variable at a time to keep the dimen-
sion of the VAR relatively low. For the impulse responses,
each of these variables is placed third in the Choleski
ordering, behind output and prices but before the federal
funds rate.
12 The spread variable is defined to be the ten-year Treasury
bond rate minus the three-month Treasury bill rate.Economic Review — Fourth Quarter 1994 23
response of prices to a federal funds shock for the
full sample as well as the 1960–79 and post-1982
subsamples once the spread has been included in
the VAR. In the full-sample VAR, including the
spread does not solve the price puzzle; prices still
rise in response to a positive federal funds shock.
However, unlike commodity prices, including the
spread eliminates the price puzzle during the
1960–79 period. The spread also eliminates the
price puzzle in the post-1982 period. That the
spread fails to work in the full sample may be the
result of the extreme volatility exhibited by inter-
est rates, including the federal funds rate, during
the 1979–82 period.
Because the reaction function of the Fed is
integral to explaining the price puzzle, we present
the response of the federal funds rate to a shock
in the interest rate spread (Figure 8). The impulse
response functions suggest that the federal funds
rate tends to move in the opposite direction of a
spread shock; a positive spread shock (that is,
long-term rates rising more than short-term rates)
causes the federal funds rate to fall. The negative
response of the federal funds rate to an increase in
the spread does not entirely square with the pure
inflation expectations explanation of the price
puzzle. A rise in inflation expectations would
more likely be reflected in an increase in the
interest rate spread, as long-term rates respond
more than short-term rates to expectations of
future inflation. The negative response of the
federal funds rate to the increase in the spread is
not, therefore, consistent with the Fed tightening
Figure 9
Impulse Response Functions
Of Y and P to Spread, 1960–93
(Spread Included)
Log level


















12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
IRF of P
Quarters
     
Figure 10
Impulse Response Functions of P
To Federal Funds Rate
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in anticipation of future inflation. However, it is
consistent with the explanation that the Fed par-
tially extinguishes the inflationary effects of a
temporary supply shock. A temporary, negative
supply shock, for example, would tend to cause
the interest rate spread to fall as short-term real
interest rates rise more than long-term real interest
rates. At the same time the spread is falling, the
Fed increases the federal funds rate to offset the
inflationary effects of the supply shocks. This gives
rise to the negative response of the federal funds
rate to innovations in the interest rate spread.13
The response to aggregate output and prices is
also consistent with the supply shocks story as
Figure 11
Impulse Response Functions of Federal
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13 Alternatively, the spread may decrease because of ex-
pectations that the Fed will tighten policy in response to
a shock that increases prices and lowers output—namely,
a supply shock.Economic Review — Fourth Quarter 1994 25
prices fall and output rises in response to a posi-
tive spread (supply) shock (Figure 9).
To determine the relative importance of the
spread and commodity prices for explaining the
price puzzle, especially in the later period, we
estimate a VAR that includes both commodity
prices and the interest rate spread.14 Figure 10
displays the impulse response function of prices
to shocks in the federal funds rate, and Figure 11
shows the response of the federal funds rate to
shocks in commodity prices and the interest rate
spread. For all three periods, the price puzzle no
longer exists; prices respond negatively to a posi-
tive federal funds rate shock. Furthermore, the
reaction of the federal funds rate to commodity
price and interest rate spread shocks are consis-
tent with the Fed tightening (at least initially) in
response to an inflationary shock, in particular,
supply shocks.15 While we do not present the
results here, the reaction of output and prices to
commodity price shocks and interest rate shocks
are consistent with those shocks reflecting supply-
side shocks in the full and the 1960–79 samples.
This interpretation is more tenuous in the post-
1982 sample, as the response of GDP to com-
modity price and interest rate spread shocks is
initially in the wrong direction for a supply shock.
Finally, an interesting result is that the inter-
est rate spread rises in response to a federal funds
rate innovation, particularly for the early sample
period (Figure 12). This mirrors the response of
the interest rate spread in spring 1994 as long-
term interest rates rose more than short-term rates
following an increase in the federal funds rate.
Conclusion
Using alternative approaches, we have docu-
mented a positive correlation between the federal
funds rate and future inflation. Known as the
“price puzzle,” this positive correlation is surpris-
ing because increases in the federal funds rate, or
tightenings in monetary policy, should theoreti-
cally lead to a lower, not a higher, price level. We
have also documented that the price puzzle is
much stronger during the pre-1980 period than
since the early 1980s. In fact, the correlation be-
tween the funds rate changes and future price
changes is close to zero in the later period.
We considered two explanations for the
price puzzle. The first, from Sims (1992), is that
the Federal Reserve systematically responds to
expectations of higher future inflation by increas-
ing the funds rate but not by enough to actually
prevent inflation from rising. A second explana-
tion is that the Federal Reserve systematically
reacts to negative inflationary supply shocks by
appropriately increasing the funds rate, but again,
not by enough to extinguish the inflationary con-
sequences of the shock.
We examine both of these explanations
within a vector autoregression framework by in-
cluding variables that may proxy for future infla-
tion or supply shocks. While including commodity
prices fully eliminates any price puzzle in the
post-1980 period, the puzzle is still present in the
pre-1980 period. We also find, however, that
including the spread between ten-year and three-
month Treasury rates eliminates the puzzle for
both subsamples. Given the negative reaction of
the funds rate to a shock in the spread, it appears
that the spread is proxying for supply shocks
rather than for increases in inflation expectations.
14 We conducted formal tests of structural stability and tests
for whether commodity prices and/or the spread Granger
caused the other variables in the system. Once again,
structural stability was rejected when the 1960–79 and
post-1982 subsamples were considered. Both commodity
prices and the spread, individually and jointly, provide
information about future values of the other variables for
the full sample. The joint exclusion of commodity prices and
the spread is rejected in the 1960–79 sample, but the
spread variable can be excluded at the 10-percent signifi-
cance level. For the post-1982 sample, one can exclude
commodity prices and the spread jointly and can exclude
the spread (at the 5-percent level) and commodity prices
(at the 5-percent but not at the 10-percent level) individu-
ally. Note that a formal rejection of Granger causality for
both commodity prices and the spread in the later sample
may be due to the rather large number of parameters
implied by the seven-variable VAR relative to the number of
observations in the post-1982 sample.
15 When the federal funds rate precedes the spread in the
ordering, the response of the federal funds rate to a spread
shock is still negative. Again, this is consistent with the
Federal Reserve’s tightening in response to a negative
supply shock. However, for this ordering, the price puzzle
remains in the 1960–79 sample.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 26
Thus, the implication is that the Federal Reserve
responds to negative supply shocks by increasing
the funds rate, but not by enough to fully offset
the inflationary implications of the shock.
One interpretation of the muted price puzzle
during the 1980s is that the Federal Reserve in-
creased the weight it placed on price stability and
reacted more strongly to inflationary shocks. Alter-
natively, it may be that the U.S. economy experi-
enced fewer severe supply-side shocks during the
1980s, which allowed the Federal Reserve to avoid
the difficult decisions associated with accepting
either a run-up in prices or a larger short-run
decline in output.
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